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Dale Jorgenson’s Presidential address to the American Economic Association
(2001) makes a convincing case that accelerated technological change in the pro-
duction of semiconductors, microprocessors in particular, has driven the recent
i n c r e a s e dp r o d u c t i v i t yg r o w t hi nt h eU . S. economy. But, while semiconductors
now ﬁgure prominently in accounts of economic growth, Jorgenson points out
that there is not a fully satisfactory economic model of the industry that produces
them. This paper is our attempt to rise to Jorgenson’s challenge.
We develop a model of the semiconductor industry and apply it to the sector
producing microprocessor chips (MPU’s). Our intention is to produce a model
that: (i) ﬁts the basic facts about this sector, (ii) explains the link between techno-
logical improvements, price declines, and product introductions (see Jorgenson,
1This paper was written for presentation at the conference in memory of Tor Jakob Klette:
Technology and Change, Oslo, August 2004. We have beneﬁtted from comments by Tom Holmes,
Erzo Luttmer, Kalle Moen, Ed Prescott, participants at the conference in Oslo, and student in the
graduate I.O. course at the University of Minnesota. Soma Dey provided helpful comments and
excellent research assistance. Any errors are our own.
12001), and (iii) clariﬁes how competition in the industry inﬂuences prices and
product introductions (see Aizcorbe, 2004). We put the theoretical model to work
in examining how the industry responds to quickening technological change. We
ﬁnd, as expected, that faster technological change leads to faster declines in chip
prices and shortened lives of individual chips. More surprisingly, we ﬁnd that
the introduction prices of chips will be higher in an environment with faster tech-
nological change. These results hold across two polar cases of market structure,
perfect competition and monopoly.
Perhaps the reason others have not taken up Jorgenson’s challenge is that, on
its surface, the industry appears so simple. On the one hand, we observe a rela-
tionship called Moore’s Law: an amazingly rapid exponential increase in the per-
f o r m a n c eo fc h i p so v e rt i m e( s e eF i g u r e1 ) .O nt h eo t h e rh a n dw eo b s e r v eas i m -
ilarly rapid exponential decline in semiconductor price indices and in the prices
of individual microprocessors over their product life (see Tables 1 and 2). Clearly
the price declines of existing products are necessitated by the fact that they must
stay competitive with newly introduced chips whose better performance traces out
Moore’s Law. We can make sense of these observations by treating chips as ho-
mogenous except that newer chips provide more of whatever older chips provide.
There is no apparent need for a sophisticated model of product differentiation,
of strategic interaction among producers, or of learning-by-doing in semiconduc-
tors, to understand these most basic relationships between technological change
and prices in the industry.
Yet, on deeper inspection, other features of the industry are more puzzling.
We typically observe a number of different chips, from the one just introduced to
products that have been around one, two, or even three years, all on the market
2at the same time. Why doesn’t the best product drive the others out of business?
Why does the industry continue to produce an inferior chip? Our ﬁr s ts t a ba ta
model of the industry attempts to maintain the simplicity of treating MPU’s as a
commodity while coming to grips with this observation about the availability of a
hierarchy of products, all on the market at any given date.
We start with a model of a competitive industry producing microprocessors.
Growth in the industry is driven by Moore’s Law which, in the model, reﬂects im-
provements in the technology of chip-producing equipment. Since technological
improvements are embodied in the equipment for production, we are led to the
model of vintage capital, developed by Salter (1960).2 I n v e s t i n gi na n yv i n t a g eo f
chip-producing equipment is a sunk cost. Thus, a given product continues to be
sold even when it is no longer the best performing chip on the market. It drops
out of the market only when the competitivep r i c ed r o p sb e l o wt h em a r g i n a lc o s t
of production.
This straightforward augmentation of the simple competitive model takes us a
long way. It delivers a convincing producer-side explanation for the rapid declines
inthe pricesof individual microprocessors over their life on the market. Producers
must make massive investments in chip producing equipment for each new chip
they introduce. These investments are speciﬁc to a particular chip and are irre-
versible. The cost of such investments can only be recouped if the price of a chip
is far above the unit variable cost of producing it when it is introduced. Produc-
e r sa n t i c i p a t et h a tt h i sm a r k u pw i l lr a p i d ly deteriorate, however, as new and better
2The vintage capital model is laid out more formally by Solow et. al. (1966). Moen and
Wallerstein (1997) show how the vintage capital model can be used to address issues of inequality
in the labor market.
3chips are introduced. We can interpret the price declines as either declines in price
markups over variable costs (given that the cost of the equipment is sunk) or as
declines in costs themselves, if we include in variable cost the high but rapidly
declining implicit rental cost of the equipment (the value of the equipment falls
to zero when the chip drops out of the market). In either interpretation, this ex-
planation stands in sharp contrast to the two most popular explanations for the
observed price declines: (i) costs fall due to learning by doing or (ii) markups fall
e i t h e rd u et oal o s so fm a r k e tp o w e ra sc h i p sa g ea n db e c o m eal e s sd i f f e r e n t i a t e d
commodity (Song, 2004; Hobijn, 2000) or due to intertemporalp r i c ed i s c r i m i -
nation (Aizcorbe, 2004). While these other explanations may have a role in a
complete quantitative model, we feel that the simple explanation coming out of
the vintage model should be the starting point.
Of course one may question the relevance of a competitive model when ap-
p l i e dt oa ni n d u s t r yd o m i n a t e db yas i n g l eﬁr m ,i nt h i sc a s eI n t e l .W ea r ea b l et o
show, however, that the predictions of the competitive model carry over, in large
part, to the analysis of a monopolist. In particular, the price paths of individual
products are unchanged up to a time-speciﬁc factor capturing the ratio of price to
marginal revenue at any date. We ﬁt this extension of the model to data on the
microprocessor industry and use the model to evaluate consequences of the speed
up in Moore’s Law that is thought to have occurred in the mid 1990’s.
Our model builds on a number of strands of the literature. As noted above, it
shares many of the features of vintage capital models. The industry equilibrium
setting is borrowed from Lucas and Prescott (1972). The model most like ours is
that of Jovanovic and Lach (1989). The main difference is that while they think
of improvements in production equipment as being driven by learning, we take
4these improvements to be an exogenous function of time. We understand that our
contribution is not in the analytics, but perhaps, is in our attempt to use the model
to understand the behavior of the semiconductor industry.
1 The Microprocessor Sector
The semiconductor industry is credited with one of the fastest rates of product in-
novation and technical change within manufacturing. Chipmakers generate wave
a f t e rw a v eo fe v e rm o r ep o w e r f u lc h i p sa tprices comparable to those that already
exist. Within semiconductors, product innovation has been especially rapid at
Intel, the world’s leading producer of the microprocessor chips that serve as the
central processing unit in computers. Developments in the microprocessor sector
appear to have been animportant driver of overallproductivitygrowth as advances
in these chips paved the way for co-invention in downstream industries that, taken
together, provide ﬁrms with more efﬁcient ways to do business.
The pace of technological improvement for the semiconductor market is often
referred to as Moore’s Law, which states that the number of electrical components
on a chip will double over a speciﬁed time period, taken to be about 24 months.3
The likely pace of Moore’s Law is studied by members of an industry-wide con-
sortium called ITRS (International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors).
Working teams made up of chipmakers, semiconductor equipment manufactur-
ers, and materials producers meet regularly to assess their ability to jointly push
out the frontier. The resulting assessment is published once a year as the “ITRS
Roadmap” and contains the expected, or most likely, path for Moore’s Law out 10
3See Flamm (2003) for an interesting history of Moore’s Law (Moore, 1965).
5or so years into the future.
An important driver of this rapid rate of innovation lies in the equipment used
to manufacture chips. The development of equipment capable of etching ﬁner
circuitry is often referred to as “process innovation” and the length of time be-
tween the introduction of the new equipment as the “product cycle.” Beginning in
1995, the industry moved from a three-year to a two-year product cycle and, thus,
opened up possibilities for an increase in the rate of product innovation.4 This oc-
curs because the sophistication of the lithography equipment determines the size
of features on chips (transistors) so that equipment that can etch narrower circuitry
can include more features on each chip and, hence, can increase the chip’s quality.
For MPU chips, the increase in Moore’s Law in 1995 is shown in the ﬁrst
line of Table 1: the growth rate for the number of transistors on Intel’s chips
accelerated from 24 percent in the 1985-94p e r i o dt o4 3p e r c e n ti n1 9 9 5 - 9 9 .T h i s
pickup is also reﬂected in an important attribute of MPUs, their speed (see line 2
of Table 1).
The prices for Intel’s chips began to decline more rapidly after 1995. In a
study of the sources of productivity growth, Jorgenson (2001) noted an inﬂection
point in the constant-quality price indexes for semiconductors (line 3 of Table
1) that was generated, in large part, by a pronounced inﬂection point in the MPU
price index (line 4). Because more rapid declines in these price measures typically
reﬂect faster rates of measured productivity, Jorgenson and others have hypothe-
sized that the inﬂectionpoint in the price index reﬂec tsasp ee d- upinM oor e ’ sL a w
that was enabled by the shift in the product cycle. These phenomena were viewed
4For additional details about this shift to a shorter technology cycle, see the International Tech-
nology Roadmap for Semiconductors (2001 and 2002 update).
6as important developments because the rapid price declines seen for semiconduc-
tors contribute importantly to increases in labor productivity for the economy as a
whole.5 However, the link between the product cycle and productivity measures
is not yet well understood and, indeed, Jorgenson has emphasized the need for
formal models of the semiconductor industry and MPU sector to better under-
stand the role of product cycles in generating productivity gains for the overall
economy.6
Product-level data for Intel’s chips show how the inﬂection point in the price
i n d i c e si sr e ﬂected in the pricing patterns of the underlying chips. Table 2 gives
summary statistics for Intel desktop chip families introduced from 1985 to 1999:
the 386, 486, Pentium I, Pentium II, and Pentium III chips. The data include the
introduction and exit prices, the number of years the chip was on the market, and
the average annual percentage price decline over the lives of the chips.
As shown in Table 2, introduction and exit prices for chips were fairly stable
over the period. The exception was the 386 which was introduce at a much lower
price and which exited at a slightly lower price. Other than that, the introduc-
tion prices were in the $600-750 range while the exit prices were in the $100-150
range. The length of time individual chips spent on the market declined through-
out the period. Chips introduced before 1995 were around for nearly 3 years while
5These issues are discussed in Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000),
and Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002), Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (2002), and McKinsey Global
Institute (2001).
6There have been surprisingly few attempts to model the semiconductor industry. For two
models of the DRAM sector see Baldwin and Krugman (1988) and Flamm(1996). There has also
been work to formally model and estimate the demand for these devices (see, Song ( 2003)) as
well as the cost parameters facing chip makers (see, Irwin and Klenow (1994) and Siebert (2002)).
7those introduced after 1995 lasted less than 2 years.
Data for the individual chips that make up these families, available since 1993,
provide a closer look at the pricing patterns. As seen in the top panel of Figure
2, MPU prices for each chip start at between $600 to $1000 at introduction and
fall steadily until the chip exits the market, by which point its price has typically
fallen to around $100. The price contours become very regular starting with the
chips introduced after 1997. Our interest in developing a stylized model of the
industry was in part motivated by this striking pattern.
Early studies of the semiconductor industry found similar contours for prices
for memory chips and attributed the downward-sloping nature of price contours
to learning economies.7 While learning may, indeed, be an important determinant
of prices for memory chips, the evidence for MPU prices is more mixed. Hobijn
(2001) has argued that, given Intel’s dominance of the MPU market, declines in
the prices of individual chips are more likely to reﬂect falling markups of price
over cost rather than falling costs. Using estimates derived from an econometric
model of demand for MPUs, Song (2001) estimated that markups were substan-
tial and fall over the life of each MPU chip. Similarly, using industry estimates
for Intel’s costs, Aizcorbe (2002) argued that costs are so low relative to price
(less than $100) that even substantial decline in costs would not pull down prices
7See Hatch and Mowery (1998) for discussion of the sources of learning curves in semiconduc-
tor production as well as a recent review of empirical studies devoted to estimating these learning
curves. Because the needed cost data are not readily available, empirical studies of the learning
curves typically use prices as a proxy for cost. The two exceptions are Irwin and Klenow (1994)
and Siebert (2002), where structural models that specify the relationship between price and mar-
ginal cost are used to obtain learning curve estimates, and Hatch and Mowery (1998), where a
unique survey was used to obtain the needed data.
8sufﬁciently to generate these contours. Finally, declining markups over the life of
each chip may also reﬂect intertemporal price discrimination over heterogeneous
buyers (Aizcorbe, 2004). Our model will deliver a very different version of this
declining markup explanation, one that holds even under perfect competition.
The graph shows that price contours for Intel’s chips became steeper in the late
1990s. This steepening is most easily seen by comparing the pre-1995 contours
with those after 1997 in Figure 2. The ﬁgure conﬁr m sw h a ti ss e e na tam o r e
aggregatelevelin Table2; pricesdroppedmorerapidly after1995 atthe sametime
that chips’ lifespans shrank. To summarize, there were two changes in the price
contours for individual MPU chips that coincided with the increase in Moore’s
Law: price contours became steeper and the length of time chips stayed on the
market decreased.
In what follows, we develop a stylized theoretical model that delivers the regu-
lar pattern in price contours seen in Figure 2. We then analyze whether the model
can explain the changes in pricing that we observe, based on an acceleration in
Moore’s Law.
2 A Competitive Industry
Our baseline model is a competitive ind u s t r yw i t hm a n yc h i pp r o d u c e r s . E a c h
producer may make chips of a different quality. A chip producer takes the price it
gets for its chips as given. Time is continuous. Producers discount future proﬁts
at rate r.
92.1 Demand
We model the demand for chips in the simplest possible way. Consumers care
only about quality units. They are indifferent between having one chip of quality
A or A chips of quality 1. The output of the industry can therefore be summarized
by the quantity of quality-weighted chips, X. The associated price per quality unit
of chip is P.
We posit a simple demand curve giving the price at which a quantity X would
be demanded:
P = D(X;t).
At any date t the function D(X;t) is downward sloping, D0(X;t) < 0. Indexing
the function by t allows for possible shifts in demand. For some purposes it is





The supply side is more intricate. Suppose a producer enters the industry at date
t by building a fabrication plant of physical capacity I (chips per unit time). The
the total sunk cost of building such a plant is qI,w h e r eq i st h ec o s tp e ru n i to f
capacity. When theplantisrunning, thevariablecostis aconstantcperchip. Thus
if a plant of size I produces chips at full capacity for l years: (i) total production
over the life of the plant is Il, (ii) total variable cost is Ilc, and (iii) total cost,
including the sunk cost of building the plant, is (q + lc)I.
We assumethatthe costofbuildingtheplant (orretroﬁtting it) isthecostofthe
chip producing equipment. A plant built at date t embodies equipment of vintage
10v = t. Such a plant produces chips of quality A(v). The notation v captures the
fact that once the plant is built, the producer has locked in a particular vintage
of technology and the plant itself will experience no technological change. Over
time, however, new and better vintages of equipment become available, that is
A0(v) > 0. Looking back in time, it is convenient to assume that limv→−∞ A(v)=
0.
When we want to parameterize the model we will assume A(v)=egv. The
parameter g is the rate of technological change. According to Moore’s Law g =
0.35. We assume that producers anticipate the working of Moore’s law, or more
generally anticipate the evolution of A(v). We take the path of A(v) as exogenous
to the producers in our model.8
Wedenotecumulativeinvestmentintheindustry, uptoandincludingdatet,b y
K(t). Thus, for v ≤ t, K(v) is the total capacity of all equipment of vintage v or
earlier, and K(t)−K(v) is the total capacity of equipment strictly more advanced
than vintage v. The constant returns to scale technology that we have assumed
allows us to ignore investments in individ u a lp l a n t sa n dt os i m p l yk e e pt r a c ko f
their sum. We keep track of the stock of equipment rather than the ﬂow to ac-
commodate the potential for spikes of investment at particular dates. Hence K(v)
need not be differentiable. Since investments are sunk, K(t) is non-decreasing.
The output of the industry is simply quality-weighted chips. Thus we can
aggregate across vintages after weighting the physical output of vintage v chips
8One could make technological progress endogenous via learning by doing. Irwin and Klenow
(1994) estimate signiﬁcant learning by doing in memory chips. Jovanovic and Lach (1989) show
how to incorporate A increasing with cumulative industry investment. We do not ﬁnd it plausible,
however, that learning by doing is the main force behind the slope of Moore’s Law for micro-
processors. We leave it for future work to explain what actually drives Moore’s Law.
11by A(v).A t a n y d a t e t,w eo n l yn e e dt ok e e pt r a c ko fas i n g l ep r i c eP(t),t h e
price of a quality unit. There is overwhelming evidence (see Table 1) that price
per quality unit has been falling rapidly over time. It will simplify the discussion,
prior to imposing the conditions for industry equilibrium, to simply require that
P(t) be non-increasing in t.
A fabrication plant built at date t, hence embodying equipment of vintage
v = t, will remain operative only for some period of time, l(v).T h er e a s o nt h e
plant shuts down is that otherwise it would lose money. The plant operates only
as long as its revenue per physical unit exceeds its unit production cost c:
P(s)A(v) ≥ c for v ≤ s ≤ v + l(v) (2)
<cfor s>v+ l(v).
We thus obtain a shutdown condition:
P(v + l(v))A(v)=c, (3)
or else, if no ﬁnite l(v) solves this equation, we set l(v)=∞, noting that vintage
v will then be operated forever.
A second condition, in this case involving the sunk cost per unit of capacity, is
that entrants take advantage of all proﬁt opportunities for investing in the industry.
In other words, the returns to investing in a unit of capacity of vintage v can never





−r(s−v)[A(v)P(s) − c]ds, (4)
which holds with equality if there is any investment in vintage v equipment. The
investment condition says that the sunk cost per unit of capacity must exceed the
12discounted net cash ﬂow per physical unit produced, given that a plant built at date
t will continue to operate until date t + l(t). As with the shutdown condition, the
investment condition holds for each vintage v = t.
With plants of vintage v operating for l(v) periods, at date t the output of
the industry will include all vintages v ≤ t,s u c ht h a tv + l(v) ≥ t. To simplify
notationwedeﬁneτ(t)tobetheageoftheoldestplantstilloperatingatdatet.T h e
shutdown condition implies P(t)A(t − τ(t)) = c, and hence l(t − τ(t)) = τ(t).
Integrating over past vintages, the total ﬂow of quality units that can be pro-
duced at date t, using vintages v ∈ [t − τ(t),t],i s
R t
t−τ(t) A(v)dK(v). An exoge-
nous reduction in the industry price at some date t would cause older vintages to
halt production leading to a reduction in X. To see this formally, note that the
lower endpoint of integration is t − τ = A−1(c/P), which is decreasing in P.I t






The supply curve is typically smoothly increasing in P. I tw i l lj u m pa tap r i c e
P, however, if there is a mass of investment in vintage v = A−1(c/P).I n t h i s
case XS(P;t) is an upper bound on supply since it entails vintage v = A−1(c/P)
being operated at full capacity.
2.3 Equilibrium
At any date t, taking account of any new investment at that moment, the equilib-
rium price per quality unit P(t) must induce a supply of quality units of chips (5)
that is sufﬁcient to match demand (1) at that price. Taking account of the possi-
bility that the vintage v = A−1( c









Since the market clearing condition involves the price at date t,i ti sc o n v e n i e n tt o
express the shutdown condition in terms of the date t price. To do so, we consider
the oldest active vintage, v = t−τ(t),s ot h a tv+l(v)=t−τ(t)+l(t−τ(t)) = t.
Similarly, the investment condition can be expressed in terms of the condition for
investment in vintage v = t − τ(t).
The initial condition for the industry, as of date t0, is the capacity proﬁle K(v)
over vintages v<t 0.W eh a v en o wd e ﬁned the shutdown condition, the invest-
ment condition, the market-clearing condition, and the initial condition. Using
these conditions, we are prepared to deﬁne a competitive equilibrium for the in-
dustry.
The industry competitive equilibrium is a set of time paths, over all dates t ≥
t0, of prices P(t) (non-increasing in t), age of the oldest productive vintage τ(t),
and total capacity K(t) (non-decreasing in t)s u c ht h a t :
1. The initial condition is given by K(v),f o ra l lv<t 0.
2. The shutdown condition, given by (3), holds for all v = t − τ(t) such that
t ≥ t0.
3. The investment condition, given by (4), holds for all v = t − τ(t) such that
t − τ(t) ≥ t0.
4. The market-clearing condition, given by (6), holds for all t.
We do not provide the conditions under w h i c hs u c ha ni n d u s t r ye q u i l i b r i u m
exists. Such conditions will be easier to interpret in the more restrictive setting of
14a stationary industry equilibrium, which we consider later. In the meantime, we
examine how our analysis can be extended to cover the case of monopoly.
3 Monopoly
The analysis above assumes competitive price-taking behavior in the industry.
Here we go to the opposite extreme and consider a monopoly. We assume that the
monopolist is interested in maximizing the discounted value of industry revenue
less the cost of investment and production.
The industry revenue function is
R(X;t)=XD(X;t). (7)




To guarantee that the monopolist’s problem is bounded and well behaved, we
assume that marginal revenue is strictly decreasing in X.As u f ﬁcient condition is
that D(X,t) is weakly concave in X. Some convex demand curves, for example a
constant elasticity demand curve with an elasticity of demand strictly greater than
one, also yield marginal revenue decreasing in X.
The analysis of monopoly is much like the analysis of the competitive industry
except that marginal revenue per quality unit M(t), rather than price per quality
unit P(t), guides the production and investment decisions of the monopolist. To
see this connection, it is convenient to have an expression for the level of demand




15But, our observations on the industry are prices not marginal revenues. To map








where ε(t) is the elasticity of demand. To be more explicit about the sources of
variationinthisratio, wecanwriteµ(t)=µ(X(t);t)whereµ(X;t)=D(X;t)/R0(X;t).
Thus µ(t) will vary with time due both to changes in output as well as due to
shocks to demand.
As in the competitive equilibrium, there are three conditions that characterize
industry behavior when the industry is monopolized: the monopoly shutdown
condition, the monopoly investment condition, and the monopoly market-clearing
condition. We consider these conditions in turn.
The monopolist will stop using a plant when the marginal revenue it generates
falls below the unit cost of production. Thus, the monopolist will operate vintage
v from date v to date v+ l(v) and will then shut it down, where:
M(s)A(v) ≥ c for v ≤ s ≤ v + l(v) (9)
<cfor s>v+ l(v),
The monopoly shutdown condition is thus:
M(v + l(v)) = c/A(v). (10)
or else l(v)=∞. Note that a monopolist will shut down a plant well before the
date at which revenue from the plant falls below the operating cost. The monop-
olist restricts industry output, keeping the industry price above the competitive
level, by not producing anything with older vintages of technology. In short, the
16monopolyshutdownconditionissimplythefamiliarmarginalrevenueequalsmar-
ginal cost condition as it applies to the worst plant operated by the monopolist.
To motivate the investment condition, it is helpful to reinterpret it as a con-
dition for efﬁcient production. Consider some plan for the production of ef-
ﬁciency units over time. Given that plan, what is the implication for produc-
tion costs of investing in an extra unit of vintage v equipment? At some date
s ∈ [v,v + l(v)], the extra unit of capacity in vintage v equipment permits shut-
ting down A(v)/A(s − τ(s)) units of the oldest vintage still being used at date s,
with no effect on the number of quality units produced. The net savings in vari-
able costs of shifting to more modern equipment is cA(v)/A(s − τ(s))A(v) − c.






−r(s−v)c[A(v)/A(s − τ(s)) − 1]ds. (11)
Since the cost of such an investment is q, we should see no investment if q>
S(v). Furthermore, we should never observe q<S (v) since such a situation
would represent an unexploited proﬁt opportunity. Thus, if there is any investment
in vintage v equipment, we have the condition q = S(v). Substituting in the
competitive shutdown condition yields the investment condition (4).
A monopolist also wants to produce efﬁciently. Hence, if the monopolist in-
vests in vintage v equipment it follows that q = S(v). Substituting the monopoly





−r(s−v)[A(v)M(s) − c]ds, (12)
which holds with equality if there is any investment in vintage v equipment. An-
other way to look at the monopoly investment condition is by comparison with
17the investment condition for the competiti v ei n d u s t r y .T h eo n l yd i f f e r e n c ei st h a t
the monopolist values output at marginal revenue instead of price.
We can rewrite the monopoly shutdown condition as a condition for the oldest
vintage v = t−τ(t) still being operated at date t. This oldest vintage in use at date
t satisﬁes the equation M(t)A(t −τ(t)) = c. The quantity X that the monopolist














The market-clearing condition simply assures that the marginal revenue on which
the monopolist bases production and investment decisions is in fact consistent
with demand.
We now turn to a special case of the model in which some of the endoge-
nous variables are stationary. In this special case we can sharply characterize the
solution to the monopolists problem.
4 The Stationary Case
A stationary conﬁguration of the industry is one in which technology grows at a
constant rate and in which each vintage is used for a ﬁxed period of time. By
restricting our analysis to this stationary case, we can characterize the solution in
much more detail. We will focus on monopoly since it is trivial to translate from
the monopoly solution to the competitive solution.




Furthermore, in our stationary case we require that the life of a vintage is constant:
l(v)=τ(t)=τ.
The stationary equilibrium does not require a constant rate of investment. But, to
deliver a constant τ, investment must be strictly positive at each date. Hence the
monopoly investment condition holds with equality.
4.1 Prices
We get predictions about prices that hold even in settings where we can say little
about investment and output. In particular, we do not need to assume any particu-
lar form for the demand curve.
Imposing the stationarity condition in the monopolist shutdown condition (10)




where b is a constant. The value of b depends on the productive life of a vintage,
b = ce
gτ. (16)


















The lifespan of a vintage, τ, is determined as the solution to (17). Given τ,t h e
value of b is obtained from (16).
A central question in our analysis is how prices are determined by the speed
of Moore’s Law, g. Thus, we want to see how b and τ depend on g. To see this
dependence in the simplest way, rewrite the monopoly investment condition as
q =
R τ
0 e−rv[elnb−gv − c]dv, where the shutdown condition b = cegτ guarantees
that the integrand is never negative for v ∈ [0,τ]. W ed e n o t et h i si n t e g r a lb y
f(τ,b,g). Now, suppose Moore’s Law is g0 >g .W ew a n tt oﬁnd the values b0
and τ0 such that b0 = ceg0τ0 and q = f(τ0,b 0,g 0).I fτ0 ≥ τ,i nw h i c hc a s eb0 >b ,
we can see by inspection that f(τ0,b 0,g0) >q ,s i n c elnb0 −g0v>lnb−gv for all
v ∈ [0,τ]. Thus, it must be that τ0 <τ. Similarly, if b0 ≤ b, in which case τ0 <τ,
we can see that f(τ0,b 0,g0) <q ,s i n c elnb0 − g0v<lnb − gv for all v ∈ [0,τ0].
Thus, it must be that b0 >b . In summary, a higher g will be associated with a
higher b and a lower τ. With higher g, each vintage will have a shorter life, and
thus to recoup the sunk cost of investment, the initial marginal revenue must be
higher.
We have pinned down the monopolist’s path of marginal revenue per quality
unit. It is interesting to note that we could do so without reference to the demand
side of the model. The implications for the monopolist’s price path is
P(t)=µ(t)M(t)=cµ(t)e
−g(t−τ). (18)
Setting µ(t)=1yields the price path for a competitive industry.
20To verify our proposed steady state equilibrium we need to show that there is
an increasing path of capacity K(t) such that supply equals demand (14) given
the proposed exponentially path for marginal revenue. A sufﬁcient condition is
that X(t) is increasing. Thus, we must restrict the demand curve to guarantee
that demand is increasing over time, i.e. R0−1(ce−g(t−τ);t) is non-decreasing in
t. This condition would hold automatically if we ignored demand shocks, i.e.
if D(X;t)=D(X). The content of the restriction is to rule out large negative
shocks to demand. Our proposed steady state equilibrium would be broken by
demand shocks so negative that vintages less than τ years old are taken out of
production. Ruling out such large negative shocks, the steady state equilibrium
has the property that positive shocks to demand as well as small negative shocks
are all met by variation in new investment. It is for this reason that in our notation
for the stock of capacity, we allowed for spikes in investment.
4.2 Investment and Output
Thus far we have said nothing about the implication of the model for investment in
the industry, other than to require that investment be positive in the stationary case
considered here. In general these implications are quite intricate. On the one hand
a positive demand shock may lead to a spike of investment. But, when that spike
is retired τ years later, there will be another spike to replace it. Thus in principle
the path of investment reﬂects current shocks to demand together with echoes of
past shocks. Working out these implications is not the point of this paper. We see
it as an advantage of our analysis that it has strong implications for price contours
without making strong assumptions about demand, and hence admitting a wide
variety of behaviors for investment and output.
21Here, we analyze the behavior of investment and output in a much more re-
strictive setting. In particular we now assume that the demand curve reﬂects a






markup is a constant µ(t)=µ = ε/(ε − 1). Second, the level of demand consis-
tent with marginal revenue of M becomes XDM(M;t)=eελt(µM)−ε.
We conjecture, and then verify, that in this setting K(t)=( k/h)eht,w h e r ek
and h are constants to be determined. Given the conjectured investment path, the
quantity of output supplied is XSM =
R t
t−τ egvkehvdv = k
h+ge(g+h)t(1−e−(g+h)τ).













Equating the growth rates on both sides of the equation above we get h = ε(λ +
g)−g. Equatingthemultiplicativefactorsonbothsides,k = ε(λ+g)(µc)−εe−εgτ/(1−
e−ε(λ+g)τ). Our conjecture is thus veriﬁed.
The equilibrium path of investment is
˙ K(t)=
ε(λ + g)(µcegτ)−ε
1 − e−ε(λ+g)τ e
[ε(λ+g)−g]t.





While output and investment are trending over time, the ratio of investment ex-







In summary, this simplest version of the complete model has six exogenous
parameters {q,c,g,r,λ,ε}. These parameters determine ﬁve endogenous terms
{b,τ,h,k,µ}. Together the parameters and endogenous terms pin down the paths
of price contours, investment, and output.
5 Microprocessor Prices
The sharpest and most robust results of the model relate to its implications for the
price contours of individual products. The data on these price contours is shown in
Figure 2. Here we focus on how the model fares in explaining these patterns. We
then go on to consider what the model has to say about changes that would result
from a speed up in Moore’s Law. Except for such a one-time unexpected change,
we will continue to impose the restriction of a stationary setting. Throughout
most of the analysis, however, we can drop the assumption of a constant elasticity
demand curve that we imposed in our analysis of investment and output above.
5.1 Price Contours
Whataretheimplicationofthemodelforhowthepricesofindividualchipsevolve
over time? In relating the model to the data, it is advantageous to derive impli-
cations for the prices of particular chips rather than working with the theoretical
concept of price per quality unit. We have data on the prices at various dates t
of particular MPU’s, deﬁned by their introduction dates. Using the introduction
23date, we associate a chip with some vintage v ≤ t.W ed e n o t eb yp(t,v) the price
at date t of the chip introduced at date v. These prices may be deﬂated by an
aggregate price index to remove any inﬂuence of aggregate inﬂation.
We denote the associated marginal revenue by m(t,v)=M(t)A(v). Holding
ﬁxed any vintage v, m(t,v) declines at rate g with t. Vintage v drops out of the
market at date t = v+τ at which point m(v+τ,v)=c. The marginal revenue of
any vintage of chip when it ﬁrst enters the market is m(v,v)=b. To summarize,
the marginal revenue of an MPU declines at rate g from the level b to the level c
during the life of vintage v, which runs from date v to v + τ.
We can take this prediction about marginal revenue to derive implications for
monopoly prices of individual chips, p(t,v)=µ(t)m(t,v). Thus:
p(t,v)=µ(t)be
−g(t−v),
for 0 ≤ t−v ≤ τ. In logarithms we have lnp(t,v)=l nµ(t)+lnb−gt+gv.P r i c e
contourswilltypicallydeclineinparallelatrateg althoughthisrateofdeclinemay
vary if the markup changes over time due to shifts in demand or movements along
a demand curve that is not constant elasticity. At any given date, the more recent
vintages (larger v) sell for more. But holding ﬁxed the age of the vintage, t − v,
the price varies only due to variation in µ(t).
Now consider what happens if the speed of Moore’s Law is g0 >g .I n t h i s
case price contours become steeper (ignoring changes in µ(t)). More surprisingly,
the price at introduction has to be higher. Thus, with faster technological change
prices fall at a faster rate but from a higher level. Products drop out of the market
sooner as well.
To focus on what underlies the price declines of individual products, we tem-
porarily ﬁx µ(t)=1 , as would be the case in a competitive industry. An important
24feature of our model, distinguishing it from much of the previous literature, is the
mechanism driving these price declines. It is typically assumed that the price
declines of individual vintages reﬂect falling production costs, say, due to learn-
ing by doing. Here unit production costs are ﬁxed. What happens in our model is
that markups over unit production costs fall over time. This prediction of falling
markups may seem odd since they occur even under competition. But, even in a
competitive environment producers need to cover their investments in equipment.
The way they do so is by entering when they anticipate being able to sell their
product at a price far above the unit production cost. This markup then fades
away over time until eventually the product is dropped when the producer can no
longer cover the unit production cost. The present value of these markups exactly
cover the sunk cost of investment in chip producing machinery.
Of course what is being called a markup under perfect competition is in fact
the normal return on investments in equipment. It is easyto showthat witha rental
market in equipment, the equilibrium rental price at each moment would absorb
all the difference between the price of an MPU and the unit cost of producing it.
Under monopoly, there is an additional markup of prices µ(t).
5.2 Transition Dynamics
What happens if there is a permanent unexpected increase in the speed of Moore’s
Law from g to g0 at date t0? Suppose that the price per quality unit at t0 is that
determined in the stationary conﬁguration. It will simplify the discussion if we
focus on the constant elasticity demand case, setting the drift in demand to λ =0 .
Thus, the price level is P(t0)=µbe−gt0 at the time when Moore’s Law speeds up.
From our earlier discussion, we know that if the industry were to jump to a
25new stationary conﬁguration, the price level would have to jump to b0e−gt0 with
b0 >b . Such a jump in price is inconsistent with market clearing. In fact, market
clearing demands that there be no change in price for a period of time until date t1,
where b0/b = eg0(t1−t0).S t a r t i n ga td a t et1the industry falls back into a stationary
conﬁguration with prices falling at rate g0.
I nt h ei n t e r v a lo ft i m ef r o md a t et0 to date t1 industry investment falls to zero.
The reason is that during this period the price of chips is not high enough to
compensate investors for the higher rate of depreciation they will experience with
technological change occurring at rate g0. Since there is no investment during this
time interval, each chip on the market at date t0 remains on the market at least
through date t1 and the price of each chip remains constant. After date t1 all
chip prices begin to decline at rate g0 and older vintages begin to drop out of the
market again. In effect, producers wait to invest until the technology of the new
equipment improves enough to allow them to recoup their investments.
5.3 Numerical Illustrations
We now turn to a quantitative assessment of the model. The ﬁrst part of this
assessment is evaluating how well the model ﬁt st h ed a t ai nt h ey e a r sj u s tp r i o rt o
1995. The second part is evaluating how well the model accounts for changes that
occurred between the period prior to 1995 and the period after that. Our particular
focus is on consequences of the speed up in Moore’s Law, which seems to have
occurred around 1995.
We use the restricted form of the complete model in which there is a constant
elasticity of demand. Thus, we need values for six parameters: r, λ, ε, g, c,a n dq.
T h ev a l u e sw eh a v ec h o s e na r es u m m a r i z e di n Table 3. We set the real interest rate
26to r = .07,as t a n d a r dﬁgure for the real return on equity. Our value for demand
growth to λ = .10. We take the demand elasticity to be slightly below Flamm’s
(1999) estimate of 1.5, setting ε =1 .3 (his estimate applied to all semiconductor
devices, not just MPU’s). This elasticity implies µ =4 .33.W es e tg = .24,t h e
growth rate of Moore’s Law around 1993. On the cost side, the value of c is taken
from Gwennap and Tomsen (1998) who report an average production cost of $75
per chip for the pre-1995 Pentium I chips. Our estimate of setup costs q is indirect.
We use data reported in ﬁnancial statements on the value of additions to machine
and structures relative to total revenues, about 20 percent in the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h e





This equation together with (17) and (16) can be solved jointly for q, τ,a n db.B y
this procedure, we obtain our value for the setup cost of q =4 8 6 .
The ﬁrst column of Table 4 shows the relevant statistics for the period fol-
lowing the introduction of the Pentium I chip in 1993. The second column shows
what our model predicts for these statistics. As can be seen, the model implies ini-
t i a lp r i c e st h a ta r er e a s o n a b ly close to those seen in the data but the simulated exit
prices and lifespans for chips are a bit higher. The model misses because actual
p r i c ed e c l i n e so v e rt h el i f eo fac h i pa r etypically much greater than measures of
technological progress traced out by Moore ’ sL a w( w er e t u r nt ot h i si s s u eb e l o w ) .
What does the model predict will change in response to a speedup in Moore’s
Law to g0 = .58? In doing this experiment, we hold the other ﬁve parameters
ﬁxed at their baseline values given in Table 3. As seen by comparing the second
and third columns, an increase in Moore’s Law implies higher introduction prices
($1071 vs. $775), shorter lifespans (2.1 vs. 3.8 years) and faster price declines (-
2758 percent vs. –24 percent). The latter two predictions are consistent with what is
seen in the data following 1995; contours became steeper and chips’ market lives
became shorter. The prediction that introduction prices increase is not borne out;
actual introduction price edged down beginning in 1995. Even so, one could still
rationalize the data if at the same time that Moore’s Law increased, some other
parameter also changed in such a way as to hold down introduction prices. One
such possibility is a decline in set up costs. The model predicts that a drop in q
generates lower introduction prices (they don’t need to be so high now that the
set up costs are lower) and shorter lifespans, without affecting exit prices or the
slope of the price contours. Another possibility would be a decline in the price
elasticity, but that would affect both introduction and exit prices, and the latter did
not change appreciably.
The transition to the new steady state is illustrated in Figure 3. Facing more
rapidly falling prices, the ﬁrm now requires a higher introduction price for entry.
Because that higher introduction price is not consistent with market clearing, there
is a stall in investment until the quality units per chip, and thus the price per chip,
rise enough to cover setup costs over the life of a chip. Absent entry, each chip’s
price remains at its t0.A t t1 the needed introduction price becomes consistent
with market clearing and entry occurs. Beyond that point, prices for all chips fall
at the faster rate, g0 = .58.
A sn o t e da b o v e ,a no b v i o u sc h a l l e n g ef or the model is why price contours are
typically much steeper than the coefﬁcient of Moore’s Law. One way to ﬁnesse
that issue is to simply assume that the true rate of technical progress advances at
t h es a m er a t ea sp r i c e so fi n d i v i d u a lp r o ducts decline. Based on this assumption
we set g = .74 for the pre-1995 period. The price contours implied by the model
28(column 4 of Table 4) are now much closer to what is seen in the data (column 1).
Predicted exit prices still appear a bit high but the simulated introduction prices
and lifespans are very close to the actual values. By construction, the rate of price
declines in this case match those in the data. Moving to an even higher value of
g = .90 for the post-1995 period, the model still predicts a substantial increase in
introduction prices, something that was not seen in the data after 1995.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper develops a theoretical model to better understand the behavior of the
microprocessor sector, an important segment within the semiconductor industry.
Despite its simplicity, the model captures two important features of the MPU mar-
ket.
First, the model accommodates the fact that MPUs of different qualities co-
exist in the market by appealing to a vintage capital framework. Producers make
product-speciﬁc irreversible investments in equipment each time they introduce a
new chip. Once these sunk costs have been borne, it makes sense to keep produc-
ing a chip, even after better versions have become available, as long as the price
exceeds the variable cost of production.
Second, the model predicts that prices fall over the life of each chip, reﬂect-
ing declines in markups for existing chi p sw h e nn e wa n ds u p erior products are
introduced. The model’s explanation for these price declines is a departure from
the existing literature. Downward-sloping price contours are typically explained
either by falling costs arising from learning economies or falling price markups
arising from market-power considerations. In our model, there is no learning
29by doing and, although we can accommodated market power, the prediction of
declining markups holds even under perfect competition. Including the implicit
rental cost of equipment as part of variable cost, the falling markup becomes in-
s t e a df a l l i n gc o s t .T h ef o r c ed r i v i n gd o w nc osts of existing products is the rapidly
declining rental price on vintage-speciﬁc equipment, who’s value hits zero when
a product drops out of the market.
We put the model to work to get insight into the consequences of a speed up
in Moore’s Law. The model predicts that an increase in the coefﬁcient of Moore’s
Law will: (1) increase the rate at which prices fall over the life of each chip
and, thus, generate an inﬂection point, (2) shorten the amount of time each chip
is sold on the market, and (3) increase introduction prices for each chip. Chip-
level data are consistent with the ﬁrst two of these predictions but do not show a
noticeable increase in introduction prices. Therefore, the only way the model can
rationalize the inﬂection point is if some other parameter changed so as to hold
down introduction prices in the new steady state. One possibility, consistent with
anecdotal reports that investment in plant and equipment at Intel declined in the
mid-1990s, is that there was a drop in setup costs. In the model, that drop in setup
costs is consistent with lower introduction prices and shorter lifespans. These
predictions hold in both the competitive and monopoly versions of the model and,
thus, do not require the ﬁrm to hold market power.
The most basic shortcoming of the model, in its present form, is its prediction
that price declines over the life of a chip should equal the rate of technological
progress. If we follow Moore’s Law and measure technological progress by in-
creases in transistors per chip or chip speed, we consistently get numbers that are
substantially below the rate at which prices of individual chips decline. What ac-
30counts for this deviation between the model and the data? Our current thinking is
that the problem stems from our simplifying assumptions on the demand side. We
m a yn e e dt oc o n s i d e ram o d e li nw h i c hd i f ferent types of consumers buy chips
on different ends of the quality spectrum. Luttmer (2004) shows how consumer
heterogeneity can be incorporated into a model such as ours. With this hetero-
geneity, it is possible that the high-end chips would support even higher markups,
l e a d i n gt oa na d d i t i o n a lf o r c ef o rr a p i dd e clines in chip prices as chips age. Even
if such an extension is needed before taking the model’s quantitative implications
seriously, we think the present model provides a good theoretical benchmark.
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35Table 1.  Selected Attributes for Intel’s Desktop Microprocessors and  
Price Indexes for Semiconductor Devices, 1985-1999 
                  
      1985-1994  1995-1999   
 
Intel’s Microprocessors 
1.       Number of Transistors          24          43   
2.       Speed  (megahertz)           17          34 
 
Price Indexes 
3.       Semiconductor Devices      - 15       - 49 
4.    Microprocessors        - 28       - 92     
            
Sources:  Authors’ calculations based on source data on characteristics for Intel’s chips  
from  www.intel.com/pressroom/kits/quickreffam.htm, price indexes for semiconductor  
devices from Oliner and Sichel (2000) and indexes for microprocessors from Grimm(1999).    
 
Table 2.  Intel's Desktop Chip Families, 1985-1999       
_____________________________________________   ___________________________  
          Chip  Families                   
               386      486         Pentium I     Pentium II  Pentium III  
 
1.  Introduction Date            1985    1989              1993         1997       1999 
  
2.  Number of Chips             10        12     15             20             9 
 
        ----------------averages  over  all chips in chip family---------------- 
3.  Prices (dollars)  
4.     Introduction           268      656    753           739         608 
5.     Exit                90      102    119           153         154 
 
6.  Lifespan (years)         3.00     2.75             2.50          1.75        1.50 
 
     ---------------------compound annual growth rates---------------------- 
 
7.  Price Change Over Lifespan     - 36     - 68    - 74         - 90        - 91 
 
Growth from previous chip family: 
8.  Number of Transistors           27       36      24            22          58 
9.  Speed of chip (megahertz)         33       11       22             34           38 
______________________________________________________________________   _   
  
Source:  Introduction dates, the number of chips for each chip family, the number of transistors and introduction speed for each chip family  
were obtained from Intel’s web site at www.intel.com/pressroom/kits/quickreffam.htm .  The average prices and lifespans for chips in each 
family (lines 4-6) were calculated using chip-level data from Dataquest, Inc. (1985-1993) and  MicroDesign Resources (1993-1999).  The 
average price decline in line 7 is calculated by applying the formula ln(exit  price/introduction price)/average lifespan to the data reported 
in lines 4-6.   
 
         
 
 
      Table 3.  Baseline Parameter Values 
r  ε  c q g λ 
.07 1.3 75 486 .24 0.1  
Table 4.  Illustration of Change in Moore’s Law  
                        
                         Pentium I           Moore’s Law         Contour Slopes   
  1993      Base Case    Increase    Base Case  Increase  
Prices (dollars) 
    Introduction        753        775    1070       772    839 
    Exit           119        325      325         210    210 
 
Lifespan (years)        2.5             3.7        2.1          1.8     1.6 
 
Growth rates (CAGR): 
     No. of Transistors         24          24       58         74     90 
     Price Declines                  -74         -24     -58        -74        -90 



















































                Dots show dates of introduction and lines are interpolations between these dates.   
           Figure 2.  Price Contours and Product Cycles for Intel’s  
Desktop Microprocessor Chips, 1993-2002  
 
                     




























   
 
   Source:  MicroDesign Resources, Inc.   
 Figure 3.  Effect of an Increase in Moore’s Law on Price Contours and Product Cycles  
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